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Paper eres2017_250:
Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate

id eres2017_250
authors Dröes, Martijn; Philip Koppels, Boris Ziermans
year 2017
title Information Asymmetry, Lease Incentives, and the Role of Advisors in the Market for Commercial Real Estate
source 24th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference in Delft, Netherlands
summary Using a unique transactions dataset, this paper examines the determinants of lease incentives in the Amsterdam office market. The study focusses on the type of landlord involved (institutional/privately owned) and whether the tenant or landlord used an advisor to help them with the transaction. The results show that an institutional landlord, ceteris paribus, offers 11 percentage points more incentives than a private owner. In addition, a landlord who uses the services of an advisor pays 16 percentage points less incentives. An advisor at the side of the tenant increases incentives by 7 percentage points. If both parties use an advisor lease incentives are not statistically different from using no advisors at all. The results in this paper highlight the crucial role of market information, information asymmetry, and bargaining in the market for commercial real estate.
keywords Commercial real estate; Advisor; Office market; Information asymmetry; Lease incentives
series ERES:conference
type paper session
discussion No discussions. Post discussion ...
ratings
session Real Estate Markets & Economics
last changed 2017/11/18 16:20
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