A Disequilibrium Model of the Housing Market: Implicit Selling Time as a Signal of Optimal Holding Periods and Buyer Valuation
||Levin, Eric; Pryce; Gwilym
||A Disequilibrium Model of the Housing Market: Implicit Selling Time as a Signal of Optimal Holding Periods and Buyer Valuation
||16th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference in Stockholm, Sweden
||We develop a theoretical model of house market disequilibrium. Price and quantity adjustments occur as the consequence of inventory adjustment in the absence of a market maker. This approach reveals a process of dynamic adjustment whereby sellers alter their reservation prices in response to implicit time on the market as a signal of excess demand. Unobservable equilibrium house prices are estimated using time on the market and house price data for Glasgow between 1999 and 2007. Empirical estimation models sellers’ reservation price response to the overhang of unsold houses and the excess demand curve within an econometric framework.
||House market, time on the market, market makers
||file.ppt (148,992 bytes)
Post discussion ...
These pages are best viewed with any standards compliant browser (e.g. Mozilla).