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Paper eres2009_267:
Secured Debt and Corporate Performance: Evidence from REITs

id eres2009_267
authors Ambrose, Brent W.; Bond, Shaun; Ooi, Joseph
year 2009
title Secured Debt and Corporate Performance: Evidence from REITs
source 16th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference in Stockholm, Sweden
summary Agency theory in modern corporate finance suggests the presence of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Prior theoretical and empirical research has identified leverage as an important mechanism that is likely to mitigate agency costs. Although debt plays a central role in mitigating corporate agency conflicts, relatively few studies have examined the implications that arise from the use of secured versus unsecured debt. Given the differences that exist in the incentives to engage in costly monitoring activities between secured and unsecured debt holders, we explore the role of secured and unsecured debt as monitoring devices. Specifically, we answer the following question: Does the use of unsecured debt result in a performance difference between firms that employ a higher proportion of unsecured debt versus firms that utilize secured debt? We find robust evidence that an increase in the use of secured debt by REITs is associated with positive excess returns in the following quarter."
series ERES:conference
content file.ppt (1,207,296 bytes)
discussion No discussions. Post discussion ...
session Investment and Finance
last changed 2009/09/16 16:22
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