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Paper eres2007_174:
Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs

id eres2007_174
authors Campbell, Robert; Milena Petrova & C.F. Sirmans
year 2007
title Corporate Governance and Performance in the Market for Corporate Control: The Case of REITs
source 14th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference in London, UK
summary We examine 111 mergers and acquisitions by public U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 1997-2005. We find that acquirer abnormal shareholder returns are significantly positive for mergers with private targets and significantly negative for public targets, a result that is consistent with findings for conventional firms. We examine the relationship between acquirer corporate governance and abnormal returns. Shareholder returns are lower for REITs wih larger and staggered boards, longer CEO tenure, lower percentage ownership by their CEO and management and when block holders are present. This is consistent with recent evidence form the conventional financial theory. Returns are positively related to the firm's operating performance prior to the merger announcement and negatively related to the leverage of the acquirer.
series ERES:conference
discussion No discussions. Post discussion ...
ratings
session Session B7: Corporate Finance Issues in REITs I
last changed 2009/11/19 09:01
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