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Paper eres2001_301:
Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More?

id eres2001_301
authors Yavas, Abdullah
year 2001
title Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More?
source 8th European Real Estate Society Conference (26-29 June 2001) Alicante, Spain
summary This note studies how mortgage borrowers with different levels of default risk would self-select between different loan-to-value ratios. It shows that for large default costs there exists a separating equilibrium in which low-risk borrowers choose bigger loan amounts than high-risk borrowers. This equilibrium offers a theoretical explanation for the seemingly counter-intuitive empirical result of Campbell and Dietrich (1983) that loans with lower initial loan-to-value ratios have higher default rates. If default costs are small, then the separating equilibrium involves high-risk borrowers choosing a bigger loan amount than low risks. For an intermediate value of default costs, the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
series ERES:conference
discussion No discussions. Post discussion ...
session Equilibrium in Mortgages Market
last changed 2009/07/10 18:07
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