Eres : Digital Library : Works

Paper eres2001_117:
A Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market

id eres2001_117
authors Ben-Shahar, Danny; Feldman, David
year 2001
title A Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market
source 8th European Real Estate Society Conference (26-29 June 2001) Alicante, Spain
summary Screening equilibria, mainly those a la Rothchild-Stiglitz(1976), have been widely used to explain various aspects of mortgage contracting. In the real world, however, most mortghage contracting processes involve both signalling and screening. In this paper, we combine signalling and screening mechanisms to examine a mortgage selection process. Borrowers “buy” different credit histories, signalling their default risk type to lenders. Credit histories, however, are imperfect signals and only partially separate borrowers’ risk types, clustering them into subsets. Then, lenders screen each subset by offering a different menu. In equilibrium, safer (riskier) borrowers maintain a better (worse) credit record and choose shorter (longer) matutity and lower (higher) risk premium mortgage loan contracts. We further show that the separating signalling-screening equilibrium is Pareto superior to a corresponding screening equilibrium.
series ERES:conference
content file.pdf (50,228 bytes)
discussion No discussions. Post discussion ...
ratings
session Equilibrium in Mortgages Market
last changed 2009/07/10 18:07
HOMELOGIN (you are user _anon_671152 from group guest) Powered by SciX Open Publishing Services 1.002